Shirka-BAYDHABAAfter patting itself on the back for putting a pause on the “Jubaland” crisis, Somalia and its international partners in IGAD and UNSOM will soon have to address the next federalism row in the country emanating from the Bay region capital of Baidoa.
Over the last several months, two competing conferences led by various Digil/Mirifle clan leaders (but involving selected other clans) have taken place in Baidoa to form a new administration called Southwestern state.
Earlier attempts to form the state from the early 2000s failed in part because of [1] internal fighting between Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) leader Colonel Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud and his deputies Adan Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade and [2] external (and often competing) efforts to integrate the RRA (one faction under the umbrella of the SRRC) within a transitional government.
The current crisis fits the mold of the previous one–though the dynamics of the crisis likely won’t turn as violent as it did years ago or resemble the Kismayo clashes that occurred over Jubaland’s creation.
Southern Somalia Map
One Baidoa camp headed by Adan Madobe has been meeting at the ADC Center to form a 6 region state encompassing Bay, Bakool, Lower Shabelle, and controversially the constituent parts of the Interim Jubba Administration (Gedo, Lower Juba, and Middle Juba – informally called Jubaland.)
Another camp supported heavily by ex-Parliament Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan has been meeting in Hotel Bakiin to form a 3 region state with Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle.
Since 25 January 2014, the SW6 camp has approved its constitution and elected Malaq Hasan Shure as Chairperson of the Constitutive Assembly of Traditional Elders that will direct the steps toward electing the Southwestern state president. In early February, SW3 also approved its own constitution–creating two constitutions for the would-be state.
Authorities from the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA) such as spokesperson Abdinasir Seerar have continued to claim a futility of Southwestern State including the Jubba region and have suggested a more “feasible” SW3 plan.
The SW6 crowd that is dominant at the moment will find it difficult to make its 6 region state a reality because of the weight and recognition (both from Mogadishu and the international community) behind the Interim Jubba Administration in Kismayo and the lack of a mandate from all the requisite communities in several of the regions it seeks to administrate.
Therefore, many suspect Sharif Hassan with SW3–though leading a less popular camp among Digil/Mirifle elite–is playing the long game to see his 3 region state plan become more widely accepted and put himself in a position to become regional president.
SW3 still would have difficulties receiving a mandate from all major communities in Lower Shabelle–especially since Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle leaders have been discussing the possibility of forming their own administration.
Thus, how the Baidoa crisis pans out will not merely be a question of how Digil/Mirifle leaders react to the situation. As usual, the roles of many other actors in southern Somalia and, of course, regional neighbors and the international community will be a dominating factor.
Southwestern State’s Big Dreams
Sub-clans within the Digil and Mirifle clan have often competed (and sabotaged each other) for control and influence in southern Somalia.
But, the historical record of marginalization meted out by other clans (in land, politics, etc.) has created the impetus among the Digil/Mirifle to become a power player through its home territory serving as the capital of a large state in a federal Somalia–a concept voiced first promoted by the Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Soomaaliyeed (Digil-Mirifle political party) in 1947.
Rather than fight (or align) with post-1991 warlords or other armed factions to become a bigger stakeholder in a federal state, Digil/Mirifle leaders can make use of the federalism process to negotiate its objectives.
Interestingly, both the history of internal rivalries and impact of longtime marginalization are playing out simultaneously in the development of Southwestern state.
Ethiopia Negotiated “Jubaland”…Now What?
Ethiopia’s August 2013 negotiation of the Jubaland crisis (via its strong role in IGAD) between Ras Kamboni leader Sheikh Ahmed Madobe and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s close aide Farah Sheikh Abdulqadir amped up Addis Ababa’s role (to the “detriment” of its rivals in Nairobi) as one of the primary outside actors influencing the federalism process in Somalia.
Even though some analysts noted that putting Madobe in the driver’s seat in Kismayo could serve as a support basis for Ethiopia’s own ONLF rebels, Ethiopia perhaps felt it was important to control the process and venue for the Jubba issue (like its approach to many conflicts in East Africa.)
Plus, with many Kenyan troops allegedly being replaced in Kismayo soon amid accusations of not being a neutral force, Nairobi’s influence in the Jubba region may be slipping as Addis Ababa’s is rising.
However, Ethiopia as a negotiator is in an awkward position. It has already set Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba on the path to eventually become a Federal Member State under what would be called “Jubaland.”
If Addis Ababa is again a venue to solve Somalia’s federalism woes, Ethiopia may have to reconcile Baidoa’s most popular aspiration (at the moment) to include the Jubba region in Southwestern state.
Notably, Ethiopia in the past has backed several militias (including the RRA) and politicians from Bay and Bakool region in order to exert influence on other stakeholders in Somalia and ostensibly to maintain strategic relations with key actors on its border. This is merely a different version of its domestic political strategy of co-optation.
As a result, it will be very interesting to see Ethiopia (part negotiator/part foreign relations strategist) try to [1] uphold the terms of the Jubba agreement while also [2] potentially seeking to firm up relations with Bay/Bakool elites it has traditionally sought to support and [3] acting in any sort of cohesion with its now AMISOM partners in “support” of the Somali government.